| PDF: |
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Author(s): |
Glukhova L. V., Gudkov A. A., |
| Number of journal: |
2(75) |
Date: |
June 2026 |
| Annotation: |
The article is devoted to the development
of mathematical tools for managing the design process
of intelligent information and analytical systems (IIAS).
In the context of the transition to a data economy, IT projects
are characterized
by high uncertainty and risks of cost overruns,
driven by the active behavior of participants and information
asymmetry between the project manager (the Center)
and the executors (the Agents).
The methodological framework of the study is a synthesis
of the theory of active systems, as developed in the works
of V.N. Burkov and D.A. Novikov, and cooperative game
theory with transferable utility. Within a normative approach,
the authors formalize IIAS design as a two-level hierarchical
system. The core research method is mechanism design, which
facilitated the development of a system of equations linking
planned labor intensity indicators, the actual state of executors,
and stimulating impacts. Unlike traditional models, this method
accounts for the stochastic nature of R&D and the non-linearity
of intellectual capital contribution.
The primary result is the synthesis of a non-linear incentive
mechanism that satisfies the conditions of individual rationality
and incentive compatibility. The application of the revelation
principle allowed for a mathematical proof that reporting true
information regarding algorithmic complexity becomes a dominant
strategy for the Agent. This neutralizes the effects of data
manipulation and eliminates excessive information rent.
The scientific novelty lies in the adaptation of game-theoretic
models to the specifics of science-intensive software, including
the consideration of learning risks and context-switching
penalties. The practical significance consists in the development
of a methodology that enables IT organizations to improve
the accuracy of metric estimations (supplementing COCOMO II
and FPA methods) and minimize transaction costs by automating
the control of interest coordination. |
| Keywords: |
theory of active systems, coordinated interaction,
mathematical management model, intelligent systems design,
incentive mechanism, game theory, IT project management,
single-level system, cost minimization, information asymmetry |
| For citation: |
Glukhova L. V., Gudkov A. A. Mathematical model of coordinated interaction between participants in the design
process of intelligent information systems. Biznes. Obrazovanie. Pravo = Business. Education. Law. 2026;2(75):13—21. DOI:
10.25683/VOLBI.2026.75.1628. |